Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1996

Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract
Benjamin C. Zipursky
Fordham University School of Law, bzipursky@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 579 (1996)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/842

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SELF-DEFENSE, DOMINATION, AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ......................................
II. Lack of Access to Genuine Alternatives as a Basis for the
Self-Defense Justification ...........................
A. Fletcher's Framework .........................
B. Fletcher's Argument for Imminence .............
C. The Social Contract, Domination, and Domestic Violence .......................................
D. The Social Contract, Self-Rule, and Dominance...
III. The Objectivity of Imminence ......................

580
582
582
584
589
593
596

A.

Fletcher's Attack on the Model Penal Code ......

596

B.

Secondary Qualities in the Law: A Philosophical Digression .....................................

600

C.

The Secondary Qualities Model of Imminence ....

602

D.

The Relevance of a History of Domination to Imminence .......................................
IV. A Modified Social Contract Model ..................
A. Extending the Social Contract Argument ........
B. No-Access Cases and the Modified Social Contract
V . Conclusion .......................................

605
605
606
608
613

* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., 1991, New York University; Ph.D., 1987, University of Pittsburgh; B.A., 1982, Swarthmore College. I am grateful to
Fordham University for a 1995 Summer Research grant supporting this work. I am also grateful
to the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and the University of Pittsburgh Department of
Philosophy for their support of the Symposium in Law and Philosophy, from which this set of
articles arose; to Claire Finkelstein, who collaborated with me in organizing the symposium and
contributed as a plenary speaker; to all of the participants, particularly our plenary speakers, Jane
Cohen, George Fletcher, Arthur Ripstein, and Elizabeth Schneider; and to Kurt Baier for his
encouragement in bringing together the Law and Philosophy faculties. I have benefitted from
discussion with Marc Arkin, Martha Chamallas, Jane Cohen, Deborah Denno, Claire Finkelstein,
James Fleming, Abner Greene, Tracy Higgins, Steven Jupiter, Maria Marcus, Linda McClain,
Daniel Richman, and Anthony Sebok. My communication with Arthur Ripstein has been a particularly important influence, as the commonality between our articles makes clear.

580

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 57:579

INTRODUCTION

If a woman kills her severely abusive husband or partner and asserts a justification of self-defense, should the criminal law take notice
of the abusive and dominating relationship in assessing the soundness
of this defense? Recent scholarship presents a dilemma. The use of past
domination evidence for self-defense as a justificationis somewhat limited; one must avoid what might be called the "private retributivist"
view that the victim was so evil that he deserved to be killed, which
improperly permits the defendant to be the judge, jury, and executioner
of her assailant.' On the other hand, it may also be problematic to rely

heavily on self-defense as an excuse. Some feminist theorists have argued that we are promoting sexist stereotypes when we cast women in
the role of pathetic victims who have done something egregious but

should be excused because they are not genuinely capable of being responsible for their actions.2 Thus, neither justification nor excuse seems
adequate to accommodate battered women's cases. 3

In what follows, I shall try to resolve this dilemma by developing a
social contract theory of justification that explains why facts about
domination are relevant to self-defense as a justification. 4 In doing so, I
hope to show that it is possible to avoid private retributivism in the
1. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
(1995) (describing trend toward private retribution in domestic violence cases); George P.
Fletcher, Punishment and Self-Defense, 8 LAW & PHIL. 201, 209 (1989) (desert irrelevant to
harm the aggressor justifiably suffers); Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1430,

TRIALS

1437-38 (1990) (reviewing CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN,
SELF-DEFENSES AND THE LAW (1989)) (history-of-domination evidence in nonimminence cases is
request "to abandon the limits on self-defense out of empathy for the circumstances of the defender and disgust for the acts of her abuser").
2. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Deborah W.
Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80
(1994) (criticizing use of "battered women syndrome" insofar as it functions by pandering to
jurors' gender stereotypes); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387 (1993); see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars
Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995) (describing agency concerns in feminist theory).
3. Cf Schneider, supra note 2 (examining victimization and agency themes in feminist theory); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 548-67 (1992) (describing tension
between victimization and agency); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal
Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2158-70 (1995) (describing lack of attention in criminal law to
domestic violence).
4. I do not mean that to suggest that the resolution of the dilemma offered here is the only
resolution. I believe it is a wide overstatement to suppose that excusing women generally involves
stereotypes that undercut the notion of women as responsible agents.
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theory of justification, to treat women as fully responsible for their actions, and to afford ample space for the notion of domination5 in the
theory of self-defense and its application.
The catalyst for my discussion is Professor George P. Fletcher's
characteristically incisive analysis of self-defense and domination in his
article in this volume.' Fletcher sharpens the dilemma I have described
by arguing that domination is irrelevant to self-defense as a justification. His two principal contentions are: (1) Irrelevance of Domination
in Challengingthe Imminence Requirement: Information on the prevalence and nature of domination and abuse by men of women in society
is irrelevant to determining whether the traditional imminence requirement of self-defense should be relaxed.7 (2) Irrelevance of Individual
Domination to Justifiability In ParticularCases: Evidence that there
was a history of domestic violence constituting a relation of domination
between the defendant and the victim is irrelevant to the applicability
of traditional self-defense to a particular defendant's case, assuming
that self-defense is operating as a genuine justification, as opposed to a
8
mere excuse.
Part II argues that, from a social contract perspective, a sufficiently pervasive social problem of physical, psychological, sexual, and
political domination of women would provide a reason to favor a selfdefense justification that did not require imminence. Thus, the existence, nature, and extent of domination is relevant to whether there
ought to be an imminence requirement, contra (1).
Building on a philosophical account of "imminence," part III argues that self-defense is not merely excusable, but indeed justifiable
when the victim engages in conduct that would have led a reasonable
person to believe that defensive force was immediately needed. Because
past domination in a relationship renders it reasonable to perceive the
victim's conduct in a different manner, such domination is relevant to
the justifiability of resorting to self-defense, and (2) is also
unpersuasive.
5. The terms "domination," "dominance," and "relations of domination" can be used in
numerous ways. See infra text accompanying notes 32-48 for a discussion of the senses in which
the terms are meant in this article.
6. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 553 (1996).
7. See id. at 553-55, 568. Fletcher does not explicitly state this proposition. For a discussion
of the appropriateness of attributing this view to him, see infra notes 17-22 and accompanying
text.
8. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 555, 570-71.
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Concepts developed in part II and part III for purposes of responding to Fletcher are put to use more constructively in part IV. The social
contract framework of part II combines with the analysis of reasonable
belief in part III to provide a sketch of an alternative philosophical
foundation for the justification of self-defense. The central idea of this
account is that a theory of self-defense must harmonize two sorts of
security interests that each of us has: the interest in remaining free
from the aggression of potential assailants and the interest in remaining free from the aggression of purported self-defenders.
Finally, this article provides an occasion to address, in one particular context, the apparent conflict within political theory between liberal
political philosophy and dominance theory in feminism, particularly
that of Catherine MacKinnon.' Fletcher, an exponent of liberal social
contract theory in the spirit of John Locke10 and John Rawls,11 argues
that social contract theory precludes a relaxation of the imminence requirement in cases of women who have been severely abused, and in
fact rejects any such relaxation as an illegitimate preference for
women. Several feminist theorists, on the other hand, see the law's tolerance of pervasive physical and sexual domination by men of women
as an emblem of true gender inequality in our society.1 2 I shall argue in
what follows that these apparently opposing ideologies can in fact be
reconciled. Indeed, at least in the context of understanding self-defense,
liberal social contract theory may provide a framework within which
the nature of dominance and gender inequality can be articulated.
II.

LACK OF

ACCESS

TO GENUINE ALTERNATIVES AS A BASIS FOR

THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

A.

Fletcher's Framework

The centerpiece of Fletcher's article is his argument that the selfdefense justification includes an objective imminence requirement. It is
useful to begin by superimposing upon Fletcher's discussion a matrix of
9. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34, 23749 (1989). This article purports to address only one aspect of dominance theory, as introduced by
MacKinnon and applied to domestic violence.
10. JOHN LOCKE, SEcoND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14-15 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690)) (recognizing self-defense within social contract framework).
11. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 208-09 (discussing Rawlsian and Kantian principle that "each
person is entitled to the maximum degree of freedom compatible with a like freedom in others").

12.

GILLESPIE,

supra note 1, at 48-49, 190-93;

MAcKINNON,

supra note 9; Martha R. Ma-

honey, Legal Images of Battered Women" Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 MIcH. L. Rav. I
(1991).
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four possible cases: objective imminence; putative imminence; objective
"no-access" (to genuine alternatives); putative "no-access" (to genuine
alternatives).
The objective imminence case is one in which the infliction of
grievous bodily harm or death by the assailant would in fact have ensued had the defendant not immediately resorted to defensive aggression. 13 The putative imminence case is one in which the defendant mistakenly, but reasonably, believed that the infliction of grievous bodily
harm or death by the assailant would have ensued had the defendant
not immediately resorted to defensive aggression. The objective "noaccess" to genuine alternatives case is one in which the assailant would,
in fact, have inflicted grievous bodily harm or death upon the defendant had she not resorted to defensive aggression, but this infliction of
grievous harm was not imminent. The reason that such harm would
have ensued is that, even though the attack was not imminent, the defendant's circumstances were such that she had no access to a genuine
avenue of relief from the assailant's anticipated attacks. It is not realistically possible for the defendant in such cases to escape the assailant
for any significant period of time, or to receive effective protection from
the authorities.
The "no-access" case is typified by State v. Norman,14 which
Fletcher discusses. Judy Norman experienced decades of serious physical and emotional abuse from her husband. She killed him while he
slept, but he had stated that he would kill her when he awoke. He had
tracked her down on every previous occasion on which she had tried to
escape. Her efforts to have him institutionalized failed and caused her
to be more severely abused. The authorities had permitted him to return home.
Norman does not fit the objective imminence requirement or the
putative imminence requirement. Yet it may be said that Judy Norman, like those in objective imminence cases, had only two realistic
choices: kill or be killed. 5 This is so because Norman's alternatives of
13. This article follows Fletcher in taking for granted the other elements of self-defense: the
unlawfulness of the original assailant's attack; necessity of level of force; proportionality or response; and intent of the defender. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 556-63. This article does not

directly focus on questions as to whether these elements must be objectively satisfied or may be
putatively satisfied in order for there to be a justification-as opposed to an excuse. Although the

views set forth below may have implications for those questions, the scope of this article is limited
to imminence.
14.

378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).

15.

Following Fletcher, this article refrains from addressing the issue of how "no duty to
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leaving and of going to the police were, as a practical matter, not something to which she had access; if she had left, he would have caught her
and killed her; going to the police would have been extremely unlikely
to cause him to be apprehended and extremely likely to aggravate his
violence towards her.
The fourth possible category is the putative "no-access" to genuine
alternatives. In this case, it is not true that genuine alternatives are
unavailable, but the defendant-the person in Judy Norman's
16
shoes- reasonably believes there are no genuine alternatives.
Hence, we may see these defenses along two dimensions. The first
dimension concerns the reason why the defendant needed to defend
herself: why she could not wait, retreat, or avail herself of the authorities. In the traditional, imminence case, the need comes from the lack
of time to avail oneself of these avenues. In the Norman type of case,
the need comes from the lack of access to genuine alternatives: typically, because of the proven ability of the aggressor to stymie any retreat, and the proven inability of the authorities to effect protection.
The second dimension concerns whether the asserted need to resort to
force was objectively present (and reasonably believed to be present),
or whether it was merely reasonably believed to be present. The former
cases are "objective" cases, the latter merely "putative."
Fletcher's thesis may be restated in these terms. In order for selfdefense to qualify as a justification, it must be in the "imminence"
(rather than "no-access") region of the first dimension and it must be
in the "objective" (rather than putative) region of the second dimension. Deviation on either dimension disqualifies the defense as a justification. One part of Fletcher's discussion addresses why only timebased, not access-based, defenses qualify as justifications. Another part
concerns why only objective, not putative, cases qualify as justifications. I will take these up in turn.
B. Fletcher's Argument for Imminence
The nub of Fletcher's argument against permitting self-defense as
a justification in a no-access case is as follows:
[In necessity cases], the imminence requirement expresses the limits of governretreat" cases, even where there is truly imminence, can be reconciled with the theory that selfdefense pertains to "kill-or-be-killed" dilemmas.
16. Fletcher's article in this issue does not in fact distinguish the third and fourth
categories.
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mental competence: when the danger to a protected interest is imminent and
unavoidable, the legislature can no longer make reliable judgments about which
of the confficting interests should prevail. Similarly, when an attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are no longer in a position to intervene
and exercise the state's function of securing public safety. The individual
7 right to
self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is necessary.'

According to Fletcher, because the government is incompetent to
decide who shall bear the costs in a particular kind of situation, individuals are permitted to make that decision in that kind of situation.18
This governmental competence is lacking where the time frame is extremely short.1 Hence, the exception for objective imminence is warranted.20 This is, according to Fletcher, a political-theoretical argument
premised on notions of allocation of authority between the individual
and the state. 21 Whether there have been dominating relationships between men and women may seem relevant in discussing who morally
"deserved" which result in some nonlegal sense, but it is irrelevant to
the applicability of self-defense as a justification, which turns on allocation of authority concepts.2 2
If Fletcher's argument for imminence is a competence argument,
it is so only in an attenuated sense. As Fletcher himself recognizes in
the quoted passage, the question in imminence cases is not whether the
legislature is in a position to make the judgment in question, but
whether the police are in a position to intervene. The point is therefore
not that the decision-making role normally reserved for representative
government must be given to the individual. It is that particular incapacitating actions, which only the police are normally permitted to
take, are deemed permissible for an individual because there is too little time for the police to serve this incapacitating function.
Additionally, while it is arguably a "competence" notion-the conception of what the government is unable to do (in imminence situations) -that permits us to circumscribe imminence situations, the justificatory foundation of Fletcher's argument is a conception of the
social contract, and not a competence notion standing alone: "Individuals do not cede a total monopoly of force to the state. They reserve the
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 570 (citing
(1978)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 570-71.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
17.
LAw

GEORGE

P.

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
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right when danger is imminent and otherwise unavoidable to secure
their own safety against aggression."2 8 Of course, this is not a description of some act of reserving rights that each individual has performed.
Rather, Fletcher must be understood as suggesting that an individual
would be reasonable to cede to the state the right to use force against
individuals, but to reserve the right to use force in imminence situations. This is a normative conclusion resting upon social contract
theory.
The most serious qualification of Fletcher's argument is that it
shows only half of what it purports to show. What it shows is that in
cases where objective imminence exists, self-defense should be permitted. However, that proposition (suitably qualified) has not been seriously in question. The more difficult proposition is that in cases where
objective imminence does not exist, self-defense should not be permitted. Fletcher has said little explicitly in support of this latter proposition. In particular, our question in this section is whether, in no-access
cases, self-defense ought to be deemed justifiable. If Fletcher is understood as answering, "No, imminence is required," then we must ask
what in his position could support that view. Thoughtful commentators
have proposed treating nonimminence cases as justifications,2 4 and it
seems plausible that if, in fact, the defendant needed to kill in order to
avert death or grievous bodily harm inflicted by the assailant, then she
had a right to kill, regardless of whether a "short time frame" or some
other limitation was the reason for her need. 5
For the purposes of exploring Fletcher's view, it will be useful to
employ the best developed social contract model: that of John Rawls.2 6
23. Id. at 570.
24. See, e.g., CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELFDEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 77-85 (1987) (imminence of physical harm not necessary for
justification); GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 185-87 (imminence requirement should be relaxed);
Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C.
L. Rav. 371 (1993) (imminence should not be required in cases like Norman); see also Arthur
Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 685 (1996); Anthony J. Sebok,
Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 725 (1996).
25. It is possible that Fletcher simply believes that there are no objective no-access cases in
the real world, or that, as an empirical matter, the level of probability of grievous bodily harm in
nonimminence cases is never high enough to warrant killing. See Sebok, supra note 24. Fletcher's
description of Norman suggests, however, that he does not reject the objective no-access case as a
possibility, but would still treat it as an excuse, rather than as a justification. See Fletcher, supra
note 6, at 555-56, 570-71, 576-77. For a discussion of putative no-access cases, see infra part IV.
26. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-21, 136-42 (1971) (describing original position
and veil of ignorance); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22-28 (1993) (explaining place of
original position and veil of ignorance in the theory of political liberalism). Like Rawls, I intend to
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Briefly, on an adaptation of a Rawlsian view, whether a given aspect of
the basic structure of society is just can be related to the following
hypothetical question: what sort of structure would be chosen by a rational person selecting a basic structure for society without knowing his
or her wealth, occupation, religion, ideology, race, gender, abilities, disabilities, and so on? This hypothetical choice situation is referred to as
"the original position." Rawls uses the term "veil of ignorance" as a
metaphor for the hypothetical inability to know whom one will be and
how one will be situated in the society selected. Hence, the form of a
Rawlsian question is: would this aspect of the structure of society be
selected by a rational person in the original position, from behind the
veil of ignorance? It is worth emphasizing that questions of hypothetical consent within the social contract framework are only expository
devices. The real questions are whether the aspects of our social structure under examination are consistent with (or perhaps even demanded
by) the bundle of rights that one may reasonably insist upon as a floor
of rights for all persons in society.
Applied to the question at hand, Fletcher's view can be formulated
as follows: a person in the original position would not rationally reserve
the right to use force in objective no-access cases.28 But why not? By
use the social contract framework as an expository device for playing out notions of what sorts of
concerns one can reasonably and impartially insist upon safeguarding, even as one recognizes the
importance and inevitability of existing within a highly developed cooperative social scheme. Cf.
DAVID GAUTmER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) (describing social contract theory of morality
and rationality that does not depend on concept of original position or veil of ignorance); T.M.
Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 (Amartya K.
Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (offering constructivist social contract theory that does not
depend on concept of original position or veil of ignorance). Note that, while the principles of
justice are for reasonable people, the thought experiment of the original position involves rationally autonomous decisionmakers, according to RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra at 72ff. Correspondingly, while this article considers rational decisions from the original position, it is with an
eye towards evaluating an acceptable system for reasonablepersons. This is not to say that the
reasonable is reducible to rational.
27. Other scholars have utilized, in a rather general way, social contract theory and distributive rights theory to elucidate the nature of the self-defense justification. See, e.g., Sanford H.
Kadish, Respect For Life and Regard For Rights in the CriminalLaw, 64 CAL L. REV. 871, 897
(1976) (self-defense right based on what a person "may claim as his due equally with all other
persons"); Phillip Montague, Self-Defense and Choosing Between Lives, 40 PHIL STUD. 207
(1981); SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE (1994) (noncontractarian rights-based account of self-defense).
28. It is a sensitive question whether the Rawlsian framework is appropriately applied to
individual questions of substantive law theory-in this case, of substantive criminal law theory.
Compare Susan M. Okin, PoliticalLiberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETmcS 23 (Oct. 1994)
(Rawlsian framework appropriately applied to questions about family structure) with S.A. Lloyd,
Situating a Feminist Criticism of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. LA. L. Rav. 1319
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definition, an objective no-access case is one in which the defendant's
own death at the hand of her assailant would have occurred had she
not resorted to self-defense.29 Why would a rational person cede the
right to prevent this from happening?
The most straightforward concern lies in the potentiality for abuse
that would inhere in a rule permitting objective no-access self-defense.
The abuse is at two levels."0 At the level of the citizen, we might see
persons who take life unnecessarily because they wrongly believe they
are entitled to do so under a no-access defense. And at the level of
courts, we might see slippage, a tendency to treat putative no-access
cases as objective no-access cases, and a tendency to spread no-access
themes across various parts of the criminal law. This would mean that
more lives would be taken than necessary or desirable. And, from the
point of view of the social contractor ex ante, knowing about the likelihood that his/her legal rule would be diluted in application, it would
mean that each of us would be less secure in bodily safety to the extent
that others would feel freer to use force against us. In other words, men
who merely seem like Mr. Norman, but are not like him, have much
less security than they would in a world without an objective no-access
justification. The fear would be particularly acute if having objective
no-access cases as justifications led courts to make putative no-access
cases justifications or excuses.31 In short, the argument would proceed,
an objective no-access justification would, in practice, lead to less personal security rather than greater personal security. It therefore would
not be rational to accept such a justification from the original position.
Ultimately, I do not want to accept or reject this conclusion. I
want to point out what kind of argument we are dealing with now, and
what kinds of considerations ought to be raised in order to evaluate its
soundness. The argument is about the effects that certain rules would
have on the security interests of persons located in various places in
(1995) (Rawlsian framework inappropriately applied to questions about family structure).

I do not mean to suggest that the application of the Rawlsian framework to questions about
the structure of self-defense would in fact fall within Rawls's own theory. Rawls's framework is
used here merely as a device for presenting a view of self-defense that is intended to stand or fall

on its own.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
30. See Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69
CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1709-10 (1981) (recognizing hazards of permitting self-defense in nonim-

minence cases).
31. But see infra part IV.B (constructing an argument for a putative no-access defense, but
building in safeguards).
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society, and whether a rational person contemplating those effects ex
ante in decisions about how much power to cede to the state would
select or reject the objective no-access justification. But if this is what
the argument is about, then relations of domination may indeed be relevant, as we shall see.
C.

The Social Contract, Domination, and Domestic Violence

I begin by noting three different respects in which one might use
the phrase, "relations of domination." First, it might be used simply to
summarize a history of abuse in a relationship, in which a man repeatedly physically harms his wife or partner, and she does not do the same
to him and is unable to do so because she is physically weaker. While
psychological harm may be (and perhaps invariably is) involved, I
mean this first sense of "domination" to be thinner.
Second, "relations of domination" might be used to evoke a psychological profile of a relationship. Lenore Walker's description of
"learned helplessness" in relationships of physical and emotional abuse
is the best known theoretical rendition of this concept.3 2 Jane Cohen
has suggested that battering relationships are microcosms of tyrannies."3 And a great deal of literature addresses the need to educate juries as to the nature and depth of the psychological dynamic between a
physically abusive man and a woman whom he has attacked.3 4 His consuming and acted-out desire to control her physically, sexually, and
emotionally, and her precarious existence at the mercy of his whim, are
characteristic of this form of domination. 5 Although I intend this usage of the term to connote a psychological aspect, I do not mean that
the only respect in which domination occurs in this situation is
psychological.
There is a third respect in which men and women may be said to
stand in a relation of domination in this society. In this sense, to comment on domination in society is not to point to any particular relationship, but to suggest that the entire social structure of society incorpo32. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SoCiETY RESPONDS (1987).
33. Jane M. Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny, 57 U. PITr. L. REv. 757 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering,9 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 195 (1986);
Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Women's Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction
Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 52-53; Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered
Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 603, 614-16 (1994).
35. WALKER, supra note 32.
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rates an assumption of the subordinate status of women. It is often
suggested that sexual domination of women by men is an emblem and
a means of pervasive domination. Professor MacKinnon has most forcefully articulated a view of this kind, and has taken pains to emphasize
that dominance as a form of inequality is not easily reducible to formal
inequality in treatment.3 6
Assessing "relations of domination" in all three of these senses is
necessary for resolving the issue Fletcher's paper presents: whether a
rational person would reserve the right to use force in objective noaccess situations. Let us begin with pure physical domination through
beating, raping, stabbing, shooting, burning, and numerous other forms
of inflicting physical injury. Defense lawyers in the field, and those who
work in shelters for women victimized by domestic violence, undoubtedly recognize this absolutely straightforward sense of domination to be
extremely forceful and daunting, whatever one might ultimately add
with regard to domination in the second and third senses. These episodes often do end in the man's murder of the woman. And when they
do not end in murder, they often end in grievous bodily harm, hospitalization, broken bones, and severe beatings. A woman's home is a common place for her to be seriously injured or killed, and her husband or
partner is a common assailant. Arguably, a woman's security against
such injuries is enhanced if she is permitted to use force to prevent
them from happening in a wide range of cases: first, because in a certain number of occasions, she may actually use the force and avert loss
of life or grievous injury, and second, because even if the force is not
used, well-informed assailants will no longer be able to rely on the likelihood that their law-abiding wives or partners will feel compelled to
7
refrain from using deadly force.
A similar argument applies with regard to the possibility of more
36. See MACKiNNON, supra note 9, at 215-34.
37. The extent to which cases of battered women killing men occurs in confrontational settings is a matter of dispute. Compare Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths
and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 397 (1991) (most
battered women kill in confrontational settings) with EwING, supra note 24, at 48 (the bulk of
killings seem to take place outside direct confrontations). As a logical matter, even if there were
no nonconfrontational killings, the component of the social contract argument in the paragraph
above would still be sound.
I am nevertheless sympathetic with Maguigan's contention that more battered woman selfdefense cases than is normally recognized are in fact standard self-defense cases. Note that
Fletcher wants to remove the label of "justification" even from many of these "standard" cases by
branding them as "subjectivist" and attacking the viability of putative self-defense as a justification. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 567-71.
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pervasive physical and psychological forms of domination. What is at
stake, in this regard, is not only physical security, but, as Jane Cohen
has pointed out, liberty of thought, speech, movement, and sexuality.
Physical domination is an instrument for the elimination of these forms
of liberty, and for the elimination of psychological independence and
well-being. And one particularly important enhancement of the physical domination is the elimination of the dominated woman's access to
outside help.38 If use of deadly force in no-access situations were permitted, then it would arguably be the case that: (1) she would increase
her ability to avert death or injury in the sort of "no-access" case that
does frequently arise in these scenarios; (2) to the extent that her sense
of lack of liberty and helplessness were based on her actual condition,
she might experience a greater sense of liberty because, if access has
truly been cut off, she will still have the right to defend herself; and (3)
the assailant could no longer count on being able to rape and terrorize
her by cutting off access and engaging in brutal conduct without facing
the risk of defensive homicide (a risk that would presumably increase
substantially if such defensive homicide were legal). Perhaps this fact
would diminish the terrorizing conduct and the cutting off of access.
With regard to both forms of domination I have considered, it might
also be added that society might change so that access for women to
alternative paths of relief were more available than it now is. If the cost
to society of no-access scenarios were women killing men without criminal liability, the state might be more motivated to provide alternative
avenues of relief. This provision of access would arguably enhance
women's security.
Finally, some feminists have argued that the forms of psychological and physical domination described above are both pervasive and
fundamental, and that they form a backdrop for the power relations
between men and women in society more generally; this backdrop permits the dominance of men over women to be replicated in many fora
that do not involve obvious physical or sexual abuse, but nevertheless
incorporate a form of female subordination. 9 Bluntly, an argument
might be phrased as follows: where women depend on domestic relationships with men and such relationships are fraught with domination,
women in every forum are expected to be, and in some sense are, at the
mercy of men. If women are permitted to defend themselves in such
38.

Mahoney, supra note 12, at 80-82.

39. See

MAcKINNON,

supra note 9, at 215-34.
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relationships, dominance in that forum may be diminished, and that
may affect more generally the degree to which women feel themselves
at the mercy of men (and men feel that women are at their mercy).
These are not intended as arguments that there should be a noaccess justification or as plans to change society; they are intended to
suggest respects in which such a rule would arguably increase a woman's security against deprivations of physical and emotional well-being and liberty. To rephrase, they are intended to suggest that, for
those who, after the veil of ignorance is lifted, turn out to be women,
they may less frequently find themselves in relations of physical and
psychological domination, and if they do, they might be somewhat less
badly off, less insecure, and more free than in a society that rejects the
no-access rule.
Even assuming all of these conjectures to be true-a very strong
assumption-at least three large questions would remain. First, how
else would such a society change women's lives, and would the sum
total changes be beneficial for women, all considered? For example, it
is possible that children would come to believe that matricide was permissible under a "no-access" rationale, and that matricide would therefore become more prevalent, as Fletcher's remarks on the Menendez
case suggest. 40 Husbands would conceivably have no-access arguments
against their wives, as might a woman's male or female partner. Perhaps women are more disinclined than men to avail themselves of violence even if they have the right to do so. And women who choose to
respond with an attempt at lethal force might find that, by raising the
level of force involved, they end up only accelerating their own deaths.
More generally, it is possible that the rule in question would end up
permitting more violence and condoning greater state deference to privately violent actors, and one might argue that such rules -particularly
when they pertain to domestic settings-tend to favor men over women
41
in actual practice.
Second, how would such a society affect men's lives? For some, it
would diminish security, particularly those who are on the "dominating" end of the domination, but also those who would suffer as a result
of Menendez extensions and other extensions of the law. But men may
be victims of some forms of dominance and pervasive fear as well, and
40.
41.

See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 571-76.
Cf Estrich, supra note 1, at 1437-38 (questioning who will benefit from relaxation of

imminence standard).
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for these men, security and psychological well-being might be
increased.
The third question, within the contractarian framework, is which
society it would be rational to select from behind the veil of ignorance,
given all of the ways it might alter security, power, and freedom in
men's and women's lives, and given the nearly equal probability of
turning out to be a man or a woman. I do not have an answer to this
question, but I hope the above comments have suggested that the best
answer is sensitive to the extent of domestic violence in society, to the
pervasiveness of physical and psychological domination in relationships
42
between men and women, and to the nature of that domination. If
Fletcher is right to suggest that the question of whether to require imminence is really a question of contractarian political theory, then he is
wrong to suggest that relations of domination should be ignored in answering that question.
D.

The Social Contract, Self-Rule, and Dominance

A contractarian framework may also help us to interpret theses
about relations of domination in the third sense I mentioned above: the
respect in which the very structure of our society is asserted to embody
men's dominance over women, even if a superficial appearance of
43
equality of treatment under the law exists.
Let us suppose that, in the original position, a person behind the
veil of ignorance would choose a law that included an objective noaccess defense. Additionally, imagine that person in the original position may wear what I shall call "gender-lenses," which permit him or
her to see through the veil of ignorance to his or her gender. It seems
plausible that the rules it would be rational to select, wearing genderlenses, might well differ depending on whether one was a man or a
woman. And I think this may be true in the domestic violence context.
While men and women could each gain and suffer somewhat by a noaccess rule, it is at least plausible, on an anecdotal basis, that a no42. Additionally, the answer should be sensitive to the possibility of legal changes independent of alterations in the law of self-defense, such as, for example, enhanced stalking laws and
greater availability and enforcement of temporary restraining orders.
43. For an illuminating discussion of the possibility of using Rawlsian theory to articulate
feminist positions, see SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 101, passim (1989)
and Okin, supra note 28. Others are less optimistic about the compatibility of Rawlsian theory
and feminist theory. See Linda Hirshman, Is the OriginalPosition Inherently Male Superior?,94
COLUM. L. Rlv. 1860, 1861-62 (1994) (criticizing Rawls's theory for failing "to confront honestly
the problem of gender").
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access rule would likely enhance women's security and liberty. 4 And I
think that Fletcher's comments on why the no-access rule would diminish security are particularly forceful if one excludes the effects on
women in domestic violence situations. In short, it is plausible that a
person wearing gender-lenses and seeing that he was a man would reject the no-access justification; but a person seeing that she was a woman would accept a no-access justification. Recall that, by hypothesis,
a man or woman not wearing gender-lenses would accept a no-access
justification.
Now in a trivial sense, the laws of such a system are unjust simpliciter, and a fortiori unjust for each member of society. But there is
an important sense in which a man (qua man) lacks standing to complain of this injustice, because what makes it unjust is that it cannot
ask for the rational allegiance of any but those who know they are
men.4 5 But it can ask for his rational allegiance, and so he is in no
position to complain. The fiction of consent, as constructed through the
concept of rational allegiance, permits the contractarian to import the
concept of autonomy, in the sense that if one is living under rules that
one would rationally have chosen, one is self-governing, and therefore
autonomous. In this sense, the fact that the rules are unjust is consistent with a man's being self-governing and autonomous.
By contrast, such a system coerces a woman, but it cannot ask for
her rational allegiance (at least with regard to the law in question4").
To this degree, social contract theory's fiction that citizens "consent" to
be bound by the law (to which they would rationally give allegiance)
does not apply to her. The state's conduct as to her is therefore coercion without consent; it is not, even in the highly abstract contractarian
sense, an aspect of her self-governance. And the existence of the state
ruling her is not even consistent with her autonomy, let alone an aspect
of it.
The picture becomes more striking when we combine the implications of the model as applied to each gender. To a certain extent, as
suggested above, contractarianism equates the ruler with those who
would rationally assent to a scheme of rules, because the foundation of
44. See Rosen, supra note 24, at 392-98 (battered women often unable to escape abusive
partners who threaten future harm or death); EwING; supra note 24; Mahoney, supra note 12, at
53-71.
45. This is not to deny that a man of some particular race or religion, for example, might

have "standing" to complain of the injustice in question.
46. The illegitimacy of one part of the law with respect to a category of persons does not
entail that all laws are illegitimate with regard to that category of persons.
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authority for contractarianism is hypothetical mutual rational consent.
To the extent that men could rationally consent to a system, I have said
they are rulers of that system. But if the system is one that a person
could not rationally consent to except if he knew he was a man, I have
argued, then that person is not a ruler of that system. Hence, although
women are ruled by the system, and coerced to accede to the system,
they are not rulers of it. Because it is in fact one and the same system,
the theoretical implication is that men are rulers of a system to which
women are unjustly coerced to accede. In this sense, men are the rulers
and women are the ruled. This might appropriately be dubbed a form
of dominance in a part of our legal and political system.
Note that this sense of dominance is not reducible to a lack of
formal equality between men and women in the formulation of the law:
the law in question is facially gender-neutral. 4' Nor is it equivalent to a
utilitarian judgment that, all told, the current society fails to optimize
women's well-being, or that the law culpably fails to correct actual imbalances between men and women. Nor is it equivalent to a claim
about the historical origins of the system, about the existence of intentional discrimination, or about the current distribution of power between men and women in government office. The law itself, in light of
our social context, constitutes a form of dominance by men of women,
and a form of gender inequality, according to this thesis.
Conversely, on this view, the adoption of a no-access justification
would not be a preference for women. It would apply equally to men
and women. Although men with gender-lenses would not choose it from
behind a veil of ignorance, persons ignorant of their gender would
choose it. In both of these senses, it would be gender-neutral. And it
follows that it would preserve autonomy for all; all would be self-ruling.
As a matter of our political structure and principles, equality not only
permits the no-access rule; it may well require it, the argument would
8
go.4
To review, Fletcher appears to be committed to the following: (a)
47. See MAcKINNON, supra note 9, at 230-34 (lack of parity in treatment under the explicit law, and lack of facial gender-neutrality do not exhaust notion of gender inequality).
48. It should be clear that Fletcher could use this very same framework to express his concern that the law of self-defense not be altered in order to address current, as opposed to structural social problems, or in order to cater to the plight of women who have been abused and then
kill their abusers. If a woman sees no-access defenses as enhancing security only when she is
wearing gender-lenses, and if our current system would be selected by all those truly behind a veil
of ignorance (with no gender-lenses), then the no-access justification would indeed reflect an illegitimate preference for women.
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the imminence requirement is based principally in concerns of competence; (b) under social contract theory, we would not reserve the right
to kill in any but imminence cases; (c) considerations of relations of
domination are irrelevant to whether attenuated imminence of no-access justifications should be permitted; and (d) the use of no-access defense would reflect an illegitimate preference for women.
I have taken issue with each of these contentions, arguing that:
(a') competence concerns explain, at most, why imminence renders
self-defense permissible, not why the absence of imminence renders
self-defense impermissible. (b') it is possible that, in light of the enhancement of physical, sexual, and psychological security that a noaccess rule would provide, a person entering the social contract would
rationally reserve the right to use lethal force in a no-access case, even
absent the imminence requirement, and thus social contract theory does
not clearly imply the necessity of the "imminence" requirement; (c')
we cannot know whether "imminence" should be required under social
contract theory without knowing a great deal about the prevalence and
nature of men's physical and psychological domination of women; and
(d') if it is the case that social contract theory would require a noaccess defense, because it would provide an enhancement of women's
security that a person would rationally select in light of the possibility
of being a woman, then it would be correct to conclude that living
under a system that forbids self-defense in no-access situations is a
form of political dominance of women, and that the rejection of a noaccess defense would be a form of gender inequality.
III.
A.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF IMMINENCE

Fletcher's Attack on the Model Penal Code

Recall that Fletcher discusses two ways cases can deviate from the
objective imminence case: perhaps lack of access, rather than imminence, is the basis of the defense, or perhaps there is not objective imminence, but merely putative imminence. We now turn to putative imminence cases.
One of Professor Fletcher's major contributions to the theory of
criminal law has been the articulation of the conceptual distinction between excuse and justification. 49 What motivates this distinction is
49. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 10.1-10.5 (1978); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 18-38 (1988);
FLETCHER, supra note 1; George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV.
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Fletcher's insistence that the law must not lose sight of the concept of
right; as the concept of right fades, we lurch toward moral chaos. The
important concept of diminished blameworthiness has unfortunately
been permitted to cloud the concept of right, on Fletcher's account, and
it must be reined in to keep right clear. Thus, it is important to distinguish excuses, which involve wrong action that is not blameworthy,
from genuine justifications, 0 which involve action to which one has a
right.51
The Model Penal Code's treatment of self-defense is an important
example of this unfortunate clouding of bases of exoneration, according
to Fletcher. It essentially treats a case of reasonable belief that there is
an imminent threat (need for immediate force) as a basis for a selfdefense justification.52 This means that even if the imminence was not
objective, but reasonably believed to exist, a justification exists, on
Fletcher's interpretation. Yet in such a case, the action is not right. By
hypothesis, there was not really a need for immediate force, as the
grievous harm to be inflicted was not really imminent. Fletcher agrees
that the defendant, if her belief was reasonable, should be excused be53
cause she was blameless. But he insists that this is not a justification.
The conclusion he reaches is that facts about domination, because they
949, 954-55 (1985) (attacking American law's willingness to treat "putative self-defense" as a

justification); see also H.LA. HART,

PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

13-14 (1968) (distinguish-

ing justification and excuse).
50. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between justifications and excuses, see Joshua
Dressier, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33C
WAYNE L. REv. 1155 (1987).
51. There is, arguably, a tension in Fletcher's own views as to whether justifiable action is
action that one has a right to engage in, on the one hand, or action that is right, on the other. On
the former view, permissibilityis the key concept; on the latter, commendability is central. Insofar as this article comments upon Fletcher as social contract theorist, the former notion of justification is more apt.
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (force justifiable when actor believes that such
force is "immediately necessary"); id. § 3.09(2) (recklessly or negligently formed belief no defense in prosecution for reckless or negligent homicide, respectively).
Fletcher has chosen the Model Penal Code to illustrate the position he is targeting. While the
choice is understandable because of the clarity of the Model Penal Code's structure, the Model
Penal Code does not actually use the term "imminence" or the term "imminent" in setting forth
the features of self-defense. It uses the phrase "immediately necessary" instead. Id. at § 3.04(1).
It is not obvious that the two terms are synonymous or the two concepts are the same. To the
degree possible, I will follow Fletcher's discussion.
53. Fletcher, supra note 6; cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 193,
passim (2d ed. 1995) (describing debate over whether putative self-defense cases are justifications
or excuses).
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are relevant only to the reasonableness of her belief, are not relevant to
self-defense as a justification (i.e., (2), above).54

The concept of reasonable belief involves (a) the reasonableness of
the belief, and (b) the fact that the defendant had the belief. The crucial question under the Model Penal Code ("MPC") concerns (b):

whether the defendant had the belief. The central moral idea is that if
she believed an attack was imminent (immediate force was needed), it
is not wrong for her to have resorted to self-defense. 5 This idea is then
qualified: if there is something defective about the defendant's formation of that belief, the belief will not necessarily form a basis of complete justification. Indeed, the MPC converts the justification into a
lowering of the crime to negligent homicide or reckless homicide in the
case of a negligently or recklessly formed belief about the need for immediate force (or about the existence of other elements) 56 This is the

MPC's interpretation of the rule in most jurisdictions that full exoneration requires not only that there be a belief in the existence of an imminent threat, but also that this belief be reasonable. Note that this rea-

sonableness (or the nonnegligently formed belief) requirement clearly
occurs as a limitation, and not as the core of self-defense. The core is
the idea that the defendant actually had the belief. If one accepts
Fletcher's argument that the defendant's subjective state of mind goes

to blameworthiness and therefore to excuse, but not to justifiability,
then his critique of the treatment of imminence (immediacy) under the
Model Penal Code is correct.
o
54. The argument in this part will accept arguendo the premise that information on past
forms of domination and abuse would be relevant, if at all, only to the reasonableness of the belief
as to the imminence of the threat. Fletcher himself does not explicitly state this premise, and there
is no reason to believe he would accept it, as is. Past domination could be relevant to the sincerity
of the defendant's belief, which is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, under Fletcher's
view. It could also be relevant to questions such as the possibility of retreat, and even as one of the
many exceptions to the exclusion of similar acts evidence (e.g., modus operandi), to whether the
abusive conduct she claims occurred on the occasion in question did in fact occur, and to what the
result would likely have been (i.e., if a certain style of attack had previously led to grievous bodily
harm, say, serious stab wounds or bullet wounds, that would arguably be modus operandi evidence
as to the existence of such an attack and the probable result of such an attack in the present).
Nevertheless, it is clear that the majority of courts admitting evidence on past conduct admit it on
the question of the reasonableness of believing a threat was imminent, and that in light of its
prejudicial force (regarding the illicit similar acts), such a centrally permissible avenue is probably essential in many cases. For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that "reasonableness" of belief is a crucial evidentiary basis of admitting past domination evidence, and ask
whether reasonableness of belief goes to the existence of a justification.
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) ("the use of force upon . . . another is justifiable
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary").
56. Id. § 3.09(2).
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Perhaps, however, the Model Penal Code put the cart before the
horse. I shall argue that a crucial question in self-defense justifications
ought to be whether the original assailant engaged in conduct that
would have led a reasonable person to believe that he would cause her
death or grievous bodily harm if defensive force were not immediately
used. If so (and if the elements of self-defense other than imminence
are present), the objective conditions of a self-defense justification are
met.57
There is one further requirement. I have no reason to reject
Fletcher's contention that the availability of this defense ought to be
conditioned on the defendant acting under the right of self-defense.58
She will not prevail in a case where she maliciously killed someone who
she later learned was about to kill her. The fortuity of external facts
that would support a right to self-defense does not suffice to undergird
the justification. These ideas are encapsulated by the requirement that
she must actually have believed that the threat was imminent. Note
that this requirement comes as an afterthought or a qualification, not
as the core of the defense. The core of the defense is that the conduct
presented to the defendant would have made a reasonable person believe that there was an imminent threat.
As will be illustrated below, the move I am making here is not
unfamiliar in the law: facts about what it is reasonable to believe under
certain circumstances may, as Kent Greenawalt has pointed out, be objective facts. 59 And legal norms may be made to turn, in some cases, on
such objective facts. Hence, it does not follow, from Fletcher's contention that justification must be based on right, and right must be based
on objective facts, that the concept of reasonable belief is incapable of
grounding the self-defense justification. Fletcher rightly condemns the
Model Penal Code on this basis, but it remains to be seen whether a
57. There are affinities between my view and that expressed by Kent Greenawalt, in response to Fletcher, in Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984). Greenawalt argues, in effect, that epistemic justifiability creates a

basis for moral permissibility in some cases. See id. at 1903. My view differs from Greenawalt's in
several respects. At a minimum, on my view, but not Greenawalt's: (1) epistemic justifiability does
not create permissibility; (2) secondary legal qualities are pivotal; and (3) the victim must have
engaged in imminently threatening conduct. In part IV, infra, I add that the victim must have
engaged in conduct that he knew or one should have known was imminently threatening, also not
included by Greenawalt. A thorough comparison of my view with Greenawalt's would go beyond
the scope of this article.
58. See Fletcher, supra note 6 (defendant must have been intending to defend against

attack).
59.

See Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 1915-18.
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different sort of reasonableness-based self-defense justification could be

constructed.60
B.

Secondary Qualities in the Law: A PhilosophicalDigression
It is difficult to get clear on how it is that facts about what it is

reasonable to believe can constitute objective features of a situation. In
this law and philosophy symposium, a metaphysical analogy may be
appropriate and helpful. John Locke famously distinguished between
primary and secondary qualities of physical objects.61 The paradigm of
a primary quality is shape or mass;6 2 the paradigm of a secondary quality is color.63 What is special about secondary qualities is that they are
defined essentially by reference to normal perceivers. Redness is that

which would produce in a normal perceiver the idea of redness.
This is a gross oversimplification of Locke's views, but that does
not matter for the moment. I want simply to note that many attributes
on the basis of which laws regulate may be characterized as secondary
attributes in the Lockean sense. To take a particularly clear example,
the tort of wrongful disclosure of private facts depends on what a "private fact" is. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private fact

roughly as that which would cause a reasonable person to be highly
offended if it were disclosed. 64 Thus, to define whether the wrongdoing
60. It may be objected that I have misconceived the basis of Fletcher's reason for treating
putative imminence cases as excusable, rather than as justifiable: perhaps the problem is that
defendant's belief (that harm will ensue) lacks truth, not that objectivity is unavailable.
The objection only holds up if the untrue belief in question is relevant to the justifiability of
the act. The point of the discussion of secondary qualities, which follows, is that justifiability does
not turn on whether harm will, in fact, occur, but on whether the conduct presented an imminent
threat-i.e., one that would reasonably have been perceived as requiring immediate force.
61. 1 JoHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 169-71, bk. II, ch.
VIII, §§ 7-9 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover 1959) (distinguishing ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities). Locke himself argued that primary qualities are real and
secondary qualities are not. Subsequent philosophers have used Locke's distinction to point out the
difference between terms that are intrinsically defined in relation to human response (secondary
property predicates) and those which are intrinsically defined independently (primary property
predicates). It is a matter of contention among philosophers whether the referents of secondary
property predicates so defined ought to count as "real," but it is a far less contentious position to
assert that their referents are "objective" in the sense described in the text. See John McDowell,
Values and Secondary Properties, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY 110 (Ted Honderich ed.,
1985) (explaining respects in which secondary qualities may be objective).
62. LOCKE, supra note 61, at 169-70, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 9.
63. Id. at 170-71, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 10.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (liability for publication of matters
"of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public").
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has occurred-and even before we reach the question of injury-we
must look at the factual statement and determine whether it disclosed a
private fact, and we answer this question by determining whether it
possesses the propensity to offend seriously a reasonable person. Similarly, in the law of defamation, it is common to define "defamatory" as
that which would lower the plaintiff's standing in the eyes of (at least a
substantial minority of) "respectable" persons.6 5 Of course, liability in
defamation law turns on whether the statement was defamatory. To
this extent, it turns on a secondary quality of the statement.
The same sorts of classifications can be found in the law of criminal procedure. Most notably, whether reasonable suspicion exists is
considered an objective fact. But what constitutes this fact is whether it
would have been reasonable to suspect criminal wrongdoing under the
circumstances. 6 Whether a Fourth Amendment right to privacy existed is an objective fact. What constitutes that fact, in the first instance, depends upon whether a reasonable person would expect a certain area to be free from intrusion. 7 Whether a government actor has
acted within the sphere of qualified immunity is an objective fact."8
What constitutes that fact is a matter of whether one could reasonably
have believed that the action in question did not violate anyone's legal
and constitutional rights.69
Interestingly, in the qualified immunity context, it is not relevant
whether the government actor did in fact hold the belief in question,
but there has been a great deal of dispute over that question.7 0 The
same holds with regard to reasonable suspicion. In the Fourth Amendment context, it is often relevant whether people do expect the area in
question to remain free from intrusion, but it is not always relevant.
For example, it is no answer in a Bivens action that the homeowners
knew the police were constantly wrongfully breaking into houses. 1 In
all of these areas, the legal norms turn, in the first instance, on whether
65. Id. § 559 cmt. e.
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) (reasonable suspicion under the
circumstances).
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).

69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987).
71. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); see Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. Rav. 349, 403 (1974) (arguing
that Fourth Amendment must not be interpreted so that government can bootstrap from regular
violation of privacy interests into absence of privacy right).
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the circumstance or conduct in question are such as would reasonably
be perceived a certain way. In this sense, the law of private facts, defamatory statements, reasonable suspicion, qualified immunity, and
Fourth Amendment invasion of privacy turns on what might be called
"secondary legal qualities." It looks to qualities that are defined by reference to the responses of reasonable persons. Of course, there is some
sense in which virtually all legal classifications depend, in part, for
their content, on human perceptions. But what is peculiar about those I
have outlined is that the law itself defines them in terms of responses of
reasonable persons.
While Locke may have puzzled over whether secondary qualities
were really part of the ultimate structure of the universe, we need not
be so ambitious in our thinking about legal secondary qualities. They
are, in principle, capable of at least two sorts of objectivity.7 2 First,
their presence or absence does not depend on any particular person's or
group of persons' actual subjective state; it is a public matter. Second,
and closely related, there is no principled obstacle to such facts being
determinable by a variety of different individuals. For example, while
different people may take offense at different things, we roughly expect
everyone to know that someone's preferred sort of sexual stimulation is
a private matter: it would cause a reasonable person to be offended if
widely disseminated without consent.
But legal secondary qualities, while they must be objective in these
respects, may also be highly particularized. For example, in the qualified immunity context, the question is whether a reasonable officer
would have (or could have) taken the action to be within the bounds of
the law under the circumstances.78 In libel law, the question is whether
a given utterance would have been understood, under the circumstances, to lower the esteem of the plaintiff in the minds of respectable
or right-thinking persons. And, of course, in criminal procedure, reasonable suspicion is reasonable suspicion under the circumstances.
C.

The Secondary Qualities Model of Imminence

The secondary qualities account presents an appropriate middle
ground in characterizing the law of self-defense. What gives a person
72.
73.

See McDowell, supra note 61, at 112.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
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the right to resort to defensive aggression is not the fact74that a given
harm will in fact ensue. Consider the following example:
The Unloaded Magnum
V puts a .44 Magnum to a shopkeeper's head in the middle of a holdup, and says, when the money has been taken, "Now I'm going to blow
your brains out." The shopkeeper reaches under the cash register for a
gun and kills the robber. The police learn that the Magnum was
unloaded.
Self-defense is clearly justified, even though the gun was not
loaded. This is a justification, not merely an excuse. It is not the case
that some attribute of the shopkeeper rendered his action blameless,
despite its being wrong. Rather, the action itself is not wrong; it is morally permissible. That is because the shopkeeper was, in fact, faced
with an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm through X's
aggression. What it means to be faced with an imminent threat is to be
presented with conduct that, under the circumstances, would lead a
reasonable person to believe that immediate defensive force would be
needed to avoid death or grievous bodily harm. Having someone put a
.44 Magnum between one's eyes and say "Now, I'm going to blow your
brains out," would lead a reasonable person to believe that defensive
force would be needed to avoid death or grievous bodily harm.
On the other hand, this account does not make justifiability turn
principally on the existence of the reasonable beliefs of the defendant.
Consider the following example:
The Unlucky Twin
D is about to go home when a police officer stops her and shows her a
photograph of an escaped murderer whom some neighbors reported
seeing in the vicinity of her apartment building. The escaped convict is
known to break into women's apartments and strangle them when they
enter. D waits for an hour or so and then gets tired and goes in. She
rings the doorbell first, thinking her boyfriend may be home. Then she
enters, whereupon she sees a stranger who looks exactly like the mur74.

This is a variation of an example that Arthur Ripstein suggested to me in conversation.
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derer. He walks towards her, smiling, and she shoots and kills him. In
fact, he was not the murderer, but rather D's boyfriend's college roommate, visiting for a couple of days, unbeknownst to D. Unluckily, he is
the identical twin of the murderer.
This should be an excuse case, not a justification case. D should be
exonerated for the murder of the unlucky twin because she reasonably
believed that immediate defensive force was needed to avoid death or
grievous bodily harm from the person she shot. Yet the twin had not
engaged in threatening conduct. Nothing he did (then or in the past)
would lead a reasonable person to believe that she was in imminent
danger. D's belief was reasonable, but not because of any threat
presented by the twin. Because the twin in fact presented no threat, the
killing was not justified. The act, taken by itself, was wrong. But because the actual belief held by D was reasonable, D is blameless for her
conduct.
"Imminent threateningness of conduct" may be both objective and
particularistic, like other legal secondary qualities. Consider the following example:
The Last Bowl of Oatmeal
V and D are mobsters. V drives D to a cabin in the woods, tells him to
sit in a chair at a table, and gives him a hot bowl of oatmeal to eat. For
twenty years, D has accompanied V to this cabin with other persons
who were similarly given a bowl of oatmeal to eat. In every case, V
pulled out a gun and killed the person while he ate the oatmeal. On
several occasions, V did this to his former partners. This was a murder
ritual for V. D shoots and kills V before he completes the oatmeal.
D is justified in killing V, not merely excused. While giving someone a bowl of oatmeal is not, generally speaking, conduct that would
lead a reasonable person to believe imminent force was necessary, it is
such conduct under the circumstances of this case (where "circumstances" include past conduct of V). It is not simply D's beliefs that
warrant exoneration, it is the objective facts of the situation. V has
engaged in life-threatening conduct toward D; that is why D believes
there is an imminent threat to his life. We analyze this conduct as lifethreatening by pointing out that it would lead a reasonable person,
under the circumstances, to believe that immediate defensive force was
needed to avoid death or grievous bodily harm.
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The Relevance of a History of Domination to Imminence

This account suggests that Fletcher is mistaken to say that the
only justification cases are ones in which the harm would in fact ensue
imminently. If "putative imminence" cases are defined as those in
which the harm would not in fact ensue, despite the defendant's reasonable belief that it would, then Fletcher is wrong to say that no putative
imminence case can be a justification (although many putative imminence cases will not be justifications). For there are many cases in
which the conduct was imminently threatening, in which harm does not
in fact ensue (and would not have). These cases, I have argued, ought
to be treated as justifications, for the trigger of the exoneration is the
objective threat of the victim's attack on the defendant, and not some
feature of the defendant's own state of mind. Of course, we could also
structure this point by saying that the class of objective imminence
cases is broader than Fletcher thinks, and includes many cases that he
would have categorized as "putative" imminence cases.
In light of this analysis, it should be clear that past circumstances
of domination in a relationship are relevant to the determination of
whether a defendant's action was justified. The question is whether the
victim engaged in conduct that, under the circumstances, would have
led a reasonable person to believe that defensive force was immediately
necessary in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm. In order to
know this, we need to know the circumstances. The question is not simply whether she reasonably believed it; that is relevant principally to
excuse, and whether she in fact believed it is a necessary second step of
the justification. The question is whether the conduct was such that a
reasonable person would believe it under the circumstances. And in order to know this, we need to know the relevant circumstances. In many
cases of women asserting self-defense in connection with the killing of a
husband or partner, the relevant circumstances will include a pattern of
physical and psychological abuse in the past. This history forms a backdrop of circumstances such that, in the mind of a reasonable person
aware of these circumstances, the assailant's present conduct leads to a
belief that the victim needs to use immediate defensive aggression in
order to avert death or grievous bodily injury.
IV. A

MODIFIED SOCIAL CONTRACT MODEL

Parts II and III were intended to respond directly to Fletcher.
Each was intended to apply independently of what the other offered.
And each was intended to work largely within a framework Fletcher

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

himself had offered. I believe these parts show that domination is relevant to whether there ought to be a no-access defense, and whether,
even within a standard model, a defendant has justifiably resorted to
self-defense.
The final part of this article is intended to be constructive and
suggestive. Parts II and III stand on their own, but in part IV, I hope
to combine a social contract account and a secondary qualities account
to synthesize the beginnings of an alternative philosophical foundation
for the law of self-defense.
A.

Extending the Social Contract Argument

The argument in part III, like the argument in part II, can be
phrased within a social contract framework. 5 On this account, one
reserves the right to act aggressively where the assailant has engaged in
threatening conduct. What triggers the right is not the existence of
conditions rendering self-defense necessary, but the existence of threatening actions. Arguably, a person in the original position would want to
reserve for herself the right to use force when the threatening conduct
is engaged in, because this is something that she is better at knowing
about than the future-oriented question of whether death or bodily
harm will ensue (e.g., she can tell whether a gun is pointed at her head,
but she cannot tell whether it is loaded). She would rationally decide to
reserve a right that permits response to perceivable threats, rather than
indeterminate outcomes.
It will be objected, however, that this version of a social contract
argument proves too much. Wouldn't the party in the original position
want to minimize the gap between when she believed there was an imminent threat and when she was permitted to use force? And if so,
wouldn't the person in the original position simply select a rule permitting her to use force if she sincerely believed there was an imminent
threat? If this is so then the distinction between self-defense as an excuse and self-defense as a justification has vanished, and, moreover,
even defendants with unreasonable beliefs would be permitted to engage in lethal self-defense.7"
This objection is myopic. The party in the original position needs
75.

Of course, part II assumed arguendo that "objective" cases and not "putative" cases

qualified as justifications, and merely addressed whether imminence was required. See discussion
supra part II.
76. Fletcher's concern over the Menendez case suggests this objection. See Fletcher, supra

note 6, at 571-76.
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to look beyond the effects of the rule for her as potential victim of the
original assailant, to the effects of the rule for her as potential victim of
the purported self-defender. A world in which an innocent person can
be killed as a matter of right because of another person's unreasonable
fantasy of an imminent threat to life lacks a fundamental kind of security. Whether I will be killed as a matter of right by another person
is something over which I have very little control, in such a world. This
77
is, ultimately, a large part of Fletcher's motivation.
The secondary quality model recognizes that one would wish, as a
potential victim of an original assailant, to have one's rights turn on
epistemically available features of the world (objective appearances), so
that one may better patrol one's own security while acting within one's
rights. Similarly, as a potential victim of the purported self-defender,
one wishes to have a higher level of control over when one's life will
become fair game for others. The secondary model view constructed
above attempts to accommodate this second aspect of personal security
by requiring that the right be triggered by the victim's own threatening
conduct. If it is his own conduct that triggers in others a right of defensive aggression, then he controls when others are permitted to use aggression against him.
These considerations can be satisfied by a rule that the right of
self-defense is triggered only when the victim engages in conduct that
he knows or that one should know is imminently threatening. 8 This
requirement would ensure that the potential victim of the purported
self-defender has ample control over his vulnerability to legal attacks
by others, and therefore has ample security against others' attacks.7 9
77.

See Id. at 567 (rejecting Greenawalt's view, in part, because "[r]easonable mistakes in

self-defense cases are about actions that are harmful to innocent people").
78. Note that this account leaves open the possibility that it is justifiable to kill a psychotic
aggressor, for the aggressor has engaged in conduct that one should have known was imminently
threatening. Arguably, the fact that he cannot be faulted for not knowing that his conduct was
imminently threatening (if that is the case), or for not refraining from his conduct, does not
undercut the contention that his conduct has triggered a right in the one he attacks.
The "psychotic aggressor" problem, and "innocent aggressor" problems more generally, merit

a thorough treatment; my point here is only that the implications of my view for such problems
are not obvious. See George P. Fletcher, Proportionalityand the Psychotic Aggressor: A Tgnette
In Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 IsR. L. REv. 367 (1973); Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL & Pun. AFF. 74 (1994); Judith J. Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL.
& Pun. AFF. 283 (1991); David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 Pin. & PuB. Ass. 356
(1987).
79. This requirement appears to diminish the epistemic accessibility of the trigger of selfdefense to potential victims of the original assailant (defendants asserting self-defense). It is not,
now, enough that there is imminently threatening conduct-the conduct must have been such that
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Ultimately, I think Fletcher is concerned about the personal control and security each of us loses by living in a society that permits the
right to use lethal force against any one of us to be triggered by an
individual defendant's subjective state of mind-a Model Penal Code
society, rather than a Fletcheresque one. But the solution, I have suggested, is not to objectivize the trigger of the justification to such a
great degree that it becomes epistemically inaccessible to the defendant. The solution is to articulate the conditions for self-defense in such
a way that each of us is, to as great a degree possible, capable of controlling when the right to self-defense against himself or herself has
been triggered. As the above considerations have also suggested, one
should try simultaneously to articulate the conditions so that they will
be epistemically accessible to each of us insofar as we may be potential
victims of original assailants. In satisfying these desiderata, we harmonize a desirable degree of personal security against purported self-defenders with a desirable degree of security against original assailants. 80
B.

No-Access Cases and the Modified Social Contract

The secondary quality model of imminence suggests the a priori
plausibility of a no-access defense that diverges from the purely objective form of no-access justification offered in part II. It may, in fact,
the victim knew or should have known of its imminent threateningness. The latter fact appears to
go to the mens rea of the original assailant, and therefore appears to be epistemically less accessible to the defendant.
This objection is only partially well-taken. The right to self-defense will be triggered by imminently threatening conduct so long as the original assailant should have known that his or her
conduct was imminently threatening, and whether it is the sort of conduct that the original assailant should have known was imminently threatening will largely be a public and objective matter,
not a matter of the original assailant's state of mind. To the extent that a gap is now left-where
the victim did not know and cannot be faulted for not knowing that he was engaging in imminently threatening conduct (Unlucky Twin 2: Unlucky Twin who displays a rope to D as she
enters her apartment, because he is in the process of repairing something) -that gap is roughly
the same as the gap in which we were already forced to place the Unlucky Twin case. The defendant's act is not justifiable, but it is excusable. The upshot is that the victim is justified in using
defensive self-aggression against the defendant; the Unlucky Twin and Unlucky Twin 2 are each
justified in fighting back. This expresses the point that the Unlucky Twin and the Unlucky Twin 2
have a right not to be killed by D, and D is violating that right, albeit excusably.
80. Of course, my comments in part II about the relevance of information about society will
have to apply to this version of the social contract argument just as much as to the version of part
II: whether this would in fact be the desirable accommodation of our security interests is a question to which we will give better answers as our information about the various kinds of experiences
people have and the pervasiveness of certain kinds of security concerns increases. The relevance of
empirically enriched accounts does not preclude offering and arguing for models based on a priori
concepts of security, but counsels against insulating such models from empirical information.
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support self-defense as a justification in a subset of the fourth category
of my matrix: putative no-access. To review, self-defense would be justified, according to the part II no-access justification, only if in fact
death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of the aggressor was inevitable, due to the absence of genuine alternative paths of relief. The
question was whether, from behind a veil of ignorance, the value of
such a rule in enhancing the physical and psychological security of
women would warrant the loss of security each person would suffer by
virtue of increased vulnerability to purported self-defenders.
The secondary quality model suggests we ask a different question.

Just as it is difficult to know which imminent threats will in fact materialize, so it is difficult to know whether the menace of inevitable death
or grievous bodily harm perceived by someone like Judy Norman will
in fact materialize. It is desirable, insofar as each of us considers his or
her vulnerability to potential assailants, for our rights to turn on what
we reasonably believe. From that perspective (and not necessarily more
generally), it would be desirable to base the right to self-defense on a
reasonable belief in the absence of genuine alternatives, even absent
imminence. But the sacrifice in security against purported self-defenders might be very great, if such a right were unqualified. Part IV.A
suggests a compromise. What triggers the right to self-defense (in
nonimminence situations) would be conduct that the victim knows, or
should know, would lead a reasonable person to believe that, because of
the absence of genuine alternatives, and because of the impending violence of the assailant, if she does not resort to defensive aggression, she
will inevitably suffer death or grievous bodily harm by the assailant.
Such conduct might be described as conduct presenting a "menace of
inevitable death or grievous bodily harm." I am proposing that the
menacing character of the victim's conduct in a no-access case is a secondary legal quality, just as the imminent threateningness of the victim's conduct was a secondary legal quality in the imminence case.
The model can therefore be more simply described. From the original position, we each would reserve the right to kill in self-defense if
confronted by conduct presenting a menace of inevitable death or
grievous bodily harm. But this reservation is qualified: it must be the
case that the victim knew or should have known his conduct presented
such a menace. In this manner, we each retain control over when we
render ourselves vulnerable to the defensive attacks of others. With this
caveat, however, we each remain able to defend ourselves when others'
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conduct is reasonably perceived as presenting a "kill-or-be-killed"
choice.
As with the social contract arguments in part II and part IV.A,
the model suggested here ultimately must be assessed from a point of
view that is empirically richer than what has been presented here.
There also may be practical reasons pertaining to political acceptability, and ease of implementation, that affect what form of no-access defense, if any, ought to be incorporated in the law, and how. It is nevertheless worth remarking that, despite the fact that the "objective noaccess" and the "putative no-access" defenses might well have fairly
similar consequences, from a broader perspective, the structural differences between them are illuminating and suggest the appeal of the "putative no-access defense."
From a defense perspective, the principal advantage of the "putative no-access" view is that the court (or jury) does not have to decide
what would, in fact, have happened. This is particularly important because lawyers, judges, and jurors may be hesitant to reach and state
the conclusion that the system would in fact have failed and fleeing
would in fact have failed and murder was in fact the only genuine
option, even if the evidence might warrant that conclusion from a
purely empirical point of view. Such conclusions conflict not only with
ordinary empirical beliefs about options, 81 but also with a sort of faith,
or trust, that society understandably inculcates in its citizens. It is (and
ought to be) an article of faith in a civilized society that private violence is not the only way or the best way to remain safe. The objective
no-access defense in part II has the unfortunate implication that courts
and jurors would have to doubt this article of faith. "Imminence"-because it depends on relatively sharp and nonhuman temporal limitations -seems to provide a discrete and undisturbing exception
to this rule. Lack of access to genuine alternatives, by contrast, depends
on contingent human failings or manipulations, not on sharp temporal
limitations. It is therefore a less discrete and more disturbing intrusion
into our article of faith. It is particularly disturbing when courts are
essentially asked to announce to the public that going to the police
would have been the wrong choice for the defendant.
The putative no-access model sketched in this part is, for this reason, pragmatically and rhetorically more palatable. One may believe
that there were, in fact, genuine alternatives, but nevertheless believe
81.

See Sebok, supra note 24, at 746-51.
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that the defendant reasonably perceived the assailant as presenting a
menace of inevitable death or grievous bodily harm. More importantly,
one may at least refrain from committing to the position that going to
the authorities or fleeing would in fact have failed. The court and the
jury need to decide whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed she was confronted with menacing conduct
from which there was no escape other than defensive aggression, and
whether the victim knew or should have known he was engaging in
such conduct.
Yet this part's model ("putative") of the no-access defense is also
harder on the defendant in some ways, for the defense is grounded on
the fact that the victim presented conduct that he knew or should have
known would lead the defendant to believe that death or grievous bodily harm was inevitable, due to the absence of alternative paths of
relief.Note that this condition effectively requires that the victim knew
(or should have known) his conduct was menacing and knew (or should
have known) that the defendant would reasonably view herself as essentially trapped. We can now see why "imminence" is such a salient
form of the self-defense justification: time limitations are generally
public; the assailant and the attacked are mutually aware of the limitation that time causes. And we can also see why kidnapping cases are
the clearest form of nonimminence, no-access cases. The assailant is
intentionally trapping the attacked, and a fortiori believes that he is
engaging in conduct that would cause the defendant to believe herself
to be trapped.
Not surprisingly, men who violently abuse their wives or partners
often intentionallytrap them or intentionally give them good reasons to
believe that they have no genuine alternative paths of relief.8 2 They do
this by threatening to find them and beat them if they try to escape
(and by carrying through on these threats); they do this by circumventing legal authorities if those authorities are contacted, and then
punishing the women more brutally for contacting the authorities, or
simply by threatening to wait out any legal obstacles and carrying
through on those threats. Martha Mahoney has aptly labelled this conduct "separation assault": the aggressor (usually, the man), through
violence and threats of violence, intentionally cuts off the routes by
which the woman may separate from him. 83 He traps her.
82.

See EWING, supra note 24, at 7-21;

Schneider, supra note 3.
83. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 6.

GILLESPIE,

supra note 1; Mahoney, supra note 12;
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The putative no-access model clarifies why separation assault is
relevant to the justifiability of self-defense, just as imminence scenarios
are paradigmatic of self-defense, and kidnapping cases often present
the most tenable examples of the possibility of justifiable self-defense
absent imminence. In each case, we can infer not only that the defendant reasonably believed she had no other choices, but also that the
assailant presented his threatening or menacing conduct in a situation
that he knew would cause the defendant reasonably to perceive a lack
of alternatives to death or grievous bodily harm. This matters not because the assailant therefore deserved it, or because he commands less
sympathy or respect- although each of these contentions merits its own
discussion. It matters because the assailant has knowingly crossed a
line that adequately delimits for a reasonable person the scope of his or
her vulnerability to others' defensive aggression, in light of his or her
simultaneous desire to be permitted to use defensive aggression when
confronted with a kill-or-be-killed choice.
Obviously, the accounts offered in parts IV.A and IV.B are rough
and incomplete. They are not intended, at this stage, to constitute a
concrete proposal for law reform. There are delicate questions concerning whether the objective account of part II may, all considered, be
preferable to the putative account, from the original position; whether
the accounts might somehow be combined; and whether, after thorough
reflection of likely consequences, the current framework is, in fact,
more justifiable. On the doctrinal front, considerations such as proportionality and differential rules of retreat would have to be addressed.
Similarly, there remain difficult questions about how the defense would
be formulated for courts and juries, how it would be announced in legislation to the public, and how to stave off serious problems of
abusability in all of these fora. The account would also have to address
the rights of third parties, the rights of an original assailant to fight
back, the effect of mistake of fact doctrine on this defense, and the
status of genuine attackers who lack mens rea. These questions would
take me far beyond the scope of this article. It is important to acknowledge that Fletcher has provided answers to most of these questions-has provided the components of a complete view of self-defense.
Yet parts IV.A and IV.B are motivated by the worry that Fletcher's
theory may not provide sufficient space for the very matters that concern him: evenhandedness rather than divisiveness, public justification
rather than private retribution, and fundamental fairness rather than
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political expediency. In that spirit, the social contract model of parts
IV.A and IV.B attempts to make a fresh start.
V.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the thrust of Fletcher's paper, men's domination of
women is relevant to whether self-defense may figure as a justification.
It is relevant to whether the law should offer a broader right of selfdefense than it currently does. The contours of the right-if Fletcher's
invocation of social contract theory is to be accepted-depend upon the
scope of the right it would be rational for each of us to reserve when we
cede our right to use force against others to the state. But how much of
a right to self-defense it would be rational to reserve, and in what context, is sensitive to the kinds of situations one is likely to confront in
real life.
Social contract theory requires that each of us must impartially
consider the possibility of being physically and psychologically abused
by others, and the extent to which another person (or, perhaps, society
through a series of persons and institutions) is likely to use violent force
or threats and menaces thereof, to render us trapped, unfree, and perpetually subordinate. In short, each of us must consider the possibility
of being a person who is dominated in this way, and the nature and
magnitude of our interest in remaining free from such domination. Arguably, a broader right of self-defense-for example, a right to kill
where there is no genuine alternative to being killed-would somewhat
reduce the pervasiveness of such domination both in particular cases
and in general. If that is even arguably so, then the nature and extent
of domination in our current society is clearly relevant to deciding what
the proper contours of self-defense are. The reduction of domination-if it is a great enough problem-might be a reason in light of
which each of us would reasonably forego a certain degree of security
against purported self-defenders. I have not argued that domination is
pervasive and structural as suggested; I have merely argued that we
need to know whether it is in order to decide what form of self-defense
justification is just.
Relations of domination are also relevant to determining whether a
defendant was justified in using lethal force in a particular case. A history of domination may render it reasonable for a person in defendant's
circumstances to perceive the assailant as engaging in conduct that requires immediate defensive aggression. But, I have argued, that is what
it means for conduct to be imminently threatening, and self-defense as

614

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

a justification turns on the imminent threateningness of the conduct. A
history of domination may therefore support the reasonableness of believing that there was conduct presenting an imminent threat, which in
turn justifies defensive aggression.
Beyond these rather modest substantive claims, I have suggested
that certain tensions within legal theory are sometimes more apparent
than real. We need not always choose between liberal political theory
and a jurisprudence of structural dominance. Not only are they compatible; social contract theory can serve as a medium for the expression
of one form of dominance theory. Similarly, we need not choose between treating woman as responsible and making room for the defenses
of battered women. Relations of domination can generate the basis for
a claim of right, not merely a plea for excuses. 84
84.
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